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I. INTRODUCTION
Unmindful of Emerson's warning that a "foolish consistency is
the hobgoblin of little minds,"' the five justic6 majority in Dolan v.
City of Tigard2 has "stumbled badly"3 in this important case. The
Court imposed a new standard for determining the constitutional
validity of land use regulations4 and, for certain important aspects
of the development permit application process, shifted the burden
of proof from the landowner to the local permitting agency.- In its
attempt to draw bright line rules, the Court has instead further
muddied the waters of regulatory takings law.
The ramifications of the Dolan decision are incalculable. The
new requirements will affect taxpayers, property owners, real estate
developers, and local governments. In 1993 alone, approximately
1.6 million building permits were issued in the United States.6
How many of these will be affected by Dolan this year? And next?
How" many building permits that otherwise would have been
granted conditional approval will now be denied? How much addi-
tional litigation will be engendered as thousands of dialogues be-
tween property owners and regulators break down? What
additional cost to society will regulatory compliance require? What
economic inefficiency has been spawned by the new burden of
proof? What further opportunities for malfeasance have been
opened? This Article addresses these questions and, in doing so,
shows that the new "rough proportionality" standard is erroneous
both in its premise and in its application to the facts of Dolan.
Part II of this Article describes the factual an.d procedural back-
ground of the case and explores the preliminary constitutional is-
sues. Part III examines the new takings law constitutional doctrine
of "rough proportionality." In particular, it exposes the lack of pre-
cedent for this standard and the inadequate support provided by
1. RALPH W. EMERSON, Sey-iance, in EMERSON'S ESSAYS: FiRsr AND SECOND SERIES 30,
39 (1901).
2. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). Chief justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion,
with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joining in the decision. Justice Ste-
vens dissented, joined byJustices Blackmun and Ginsburg. Justice Souter filed a separate
dissent.
3. Id. at 2330 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. See generaly id. at 2319-20 (delineating the majority's "rough proportionality"
standard).
5. See generaly id. at 2320 n.8 (explaining the shift of the burden of proof to
government).
6. International Trade Administration, U.S. Dept of Commerce, CONSTRUTION RE,
viEw, Winter 1994, at 15, 23 [hereinafter CONSTRUCTION REviEW].
[Vol. 14:215
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the cases on which the majority relies. Part IV analyzes the applica-
tion of "rough proportionality" to the facts of Dolan and deter-
mines that the Court's decision constituted an abuse of discretion.
Part V takes an in-depth look at the most egregious aspect of the
Dolan opinion: the practical impact of shifting the evidentiary bur-
den of proof. It-concludes that this shift contradicts decades of
constitutional jurisprudence and that its practical effects-delay or
denial of building permits-will result in staggering economic loss.
Part VI evaluates the new doctrine by revisiting key cases and find-
ing that each decision would have a different result had Dolan's
standard been applied. Finally, Part VII concludes by suggesting a
better path for takings law and arguing that property rights advo-
cates will regret their "victory" in Dolan. The author concludes that
the only logical explanation for the result in Dolan was that the
Court's decision was politically and ideologically predetermined.'
H]. BACKGROUND OF DOLAN V. Cr"y o Tia4RD
A. Factual and Procedural History
The City of Tigard is a suburb of Portland, Oregon, with a pop-
ilation of 0,000. In compliance with statutory mandates from the
State of Oregon,' Tigard developed a comprehensive land use plan
to manage urban growth in an orderly fashion. To implement the
plan, Tigard codified numerous zoning ordinances and other regu-
lations consistent with that plan in its Community Development
Code ("CDC").9
7. Professor Lazarus shares this concern. In writing about Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), he declared:
At least whenever a so-called "horrible" takings case has reached the Supreme
Court, a full airing of the facts has revealed only adversarial smoke. The extreme
cases have yet to materialize, which is why the Court in Lucas had to base its ruling
on a hypothetical fact pattern. A political movement derived from anecdotal ac-
counts of governmental abuses, rather than an actual case or controversy, is the
root of the majority ruling in Luas.
RichardJ. Lazarus, Putting the Conrect "Spin" on Lucas% 45 STAN. L RE%, 1411, 1421 (1993)
(citation omitted).
8. Op. REv. STAT. §§ 197.010, 197.175, 197.250 (1993) (in 1973, the Oregon legisla-
ture enacted a land use management program requiring all cities and counties to adopt
comprehensive land use ilans consistent with statewide planning goals).
9. SeTscAum, OR., CoMM'uNrYDEv. CODE, §§ 18.66, 18.86 (1983) [hereinafter CDC].
The Community Development Code mandates that property owners in areas zoned Cen-
tral Business District comply with a 15% open space and landscaping requirement and
facilitate city planning goals. Mrs. Dolan's property is located in the Central Business Dis-
trict's "Action Area" Overlay Zone. Tigard enacted the "Action Area Overlay Zone to au-
thorize the attachment of conditions to developnients in order to proide for projected
transportation and public facility needs. Id. § 18.86.040.
19951
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At the time of the case, the petitioner, Mrs. Florence Dolan,
owned 1.67 acres of land fronting Main Street'in the center of
downtown Tigard. She operated a 9,700-square-foot plumbing and
electrical supply store on the eastern side of this parcel;' 0 the west-
em edge and southwestern comer of the site bordered Fanno
Creek," well-known locally for its frequent flooding.12 The creek
was buffered by a one-hundred-year floodplain zoned for zero de-
velopment.' 3 Therefore, according to the Comprehensive Plan,
Mrs. Dolan could not develop the portion of her property that lay
within the floodplain. 14
In 1992, Mrs. Dolan applied to the City for permission to build
a new store, nearly twice as large as the existing one, on the south-
western portion of the site, and to pave thirty-nine parking
spaces.' 5 Her plan called for demolishing the existing store in
stages as construction of the new store progressed. Later, she
planned to build another structure and add more paved parking
on the northeastern portion of the site.'6
The City Planning Commission (Commission), acting in com-
pliance with the CDC, 7 agreed to approve Mrs. Dolan's permit ap-
plication upon two conditions: (1) that she dedicate to the City
the portion of her property that fell within the one-hundred-year
floodplain;18 and (2) that she dedicate to the City a fifteen-foot-
10. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-518) [hereinafter Brief for the United
States]. This store is one of several that Mrs. Dolan owns and operates. Brief for Respon-
dent at 1, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-518) [hereinafter Brief
for Respondent].
11. Brief for the United States, supra note 10, at 4.
12. Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of State Floodplain Managers in Support of
Respondent at 13-14, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-518) (herein-
after Brief of State Floodplain Managers].
13. TiGARD, OR., COMPREHENSIVE PLAN § 3.2 (1974).
14. See CDC, supra note 9, § 18.84.040A7 (requiring Tigard to condition approval of
developments within and adjacent to the floodplain with the dedication of an easement In
order to further the goal of controlling the flooding problems caused by additional
development).
15. Brief for the United States, supra note 10, at 4.
16. Id.
17. See CDC, supra note 9, § 18.120.020A (stating that major modifications are sub-
ject to a site development review). The site development review enables Tigard to acquire
information on the necessity of additional flood control and traffic reduction measures; it
then requires, where appropriate, mitigation of flood and traffic problems. I&. §§ 18,84,
18.120.090, 18.120.100, 18.164.030, 18.164.100.
18. See id. §§ 18.120.180, 18.120.180A8, 18.120.180.A.15 (stating that the City shall
require dedication of open land area when development is allowed in and near the hun-
dred-year floodplain and that all drainage plans must be consistent with the master drain-
HeinOnline  -- 14 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 218 1995
wide strip of land adjacent to the floodplain. 19 The two dedica-
tions comprised approximately ten percent (roughly 7,000 square
feet) of Mrs. Dolan's property.20 The primary purpose of the first
dedicati6n was to enable the City, at its own expense, to dig a chan-
nel and take other steps to improve the storm drainage system
along Fanno Creek.2 ' Any portion of the dedicated property
within the floodplain not used for this specific purpose was man-
dated for use as a public greenway. The purpose of the second
dedication was to enable the City to construct a portion of a
planned pedestrian/bicycle pathway in order to mitigate the ef-
fects of additional automobile traffic on the City's already
overburdened streets.23
Mrs. Dolan requested a variance from the conditions which the
Commission imposed on her development permit. However, her
request for a variance did not include information on the antici-
pated impacts of her proposed construcdon on drainage and traf-
fic, nor did it suggest any alternative conditions.24 Therefore, the
Commission denied the variance based on two of its own findings.
First, it found that the increase in impervious surface on Mrs. Do-
lan's property would cause additional stormwater runoff. When
combined with increased runoff from the development of other
properties in the drainage basin, this was expected to increase
streamflow and exacerbate flooding along Fanno Creek.' Second,
the Commission anticipated that the expansion of Mrs. Dolan's
wholesale and retail operation would generate an additional 435
age plan). The dedication was to be a permanent easement that would allow Tigard to
proceed with mandated flood control measures involving the deepening and widening of
Fanno Creek, and to have continuous access to the area for repair and maintenance. Brief
for Respondent, supra note 10, at 8-10.
19. Brief for the United States, supra note 10, at 5.
20. Id- However, the Commission allowed Mrs. Dolan to use the dedicated property
to fulfill the 15% open space and landscaping obligations of Tigard's zoning code. In
addition, the City agreed to landscape and maintain the area bordering the dedicated land
and the Dolan property. Mrs. Dolan was required to paya triffic impact fee and a separate
fee in lieu of having to build on-site facilities to prevent surface water runoff. Both of these
fees were imposed by the County. I&
21. Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 10.
22. The Commission denominated all of the dedicated property as "Greenway.* Brief
for the United States, supra note 10, at 5. The Tigard Park Plan requires the utilization of
greenways in the Fanno Creek area for the combined purposes of storm drainage, recrea-
tion, and transportation. Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 9.
23. Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 10-12.
24. Id. at 4-6. The CDC requires such information relating to drainage and traffic
impacts when making decisions on development approval. Id.
25. Brief of State Floodplain Managers, supra note 12, at 14.
1995] TAIMVNG. LAW 219
HeinOnline  -- 14 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 219 1995
220 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNVAL
automobile trips per weekday.26
Mrs. Dolan appealed the denial of the variance to the state
Land Use Board of Appeals ("LUBA") .27 She claimed that the
City's exactions were unrelated to her proposed development and
that they therefore constituted an uncompensated taking under
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 28 LUBA
disagreed, holding that the City's findings regarding its flood and
traffic concerns established a "reasonable relationship" between
Mrs. Dolan's request for a building permit and the City's condi-
tions of approval. 9
Both the Oregon Court of Appeals"° and the Oregon Supreme
Court 1 affirmed LUBA's decision. The Oregon Supreme Court
based its decision on its interpretation of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission:12 that "an exaction is reasonably related to an impact
if the exaction serves the same purpose that a denial of the permit
would serve." 8 The Oregon Supreme Court determined that
Tigard's conditions had an essential connection to the impact of
the proposed development. Therefore, because the City met the
reasonable relationship standard, there was no uncompensated
taking.-' Mrs. Dolan then appealed to the Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari to resolve any inconsistency between its decision
in Nollan and the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Dolan.
B. Preliminary Constitutional Issues
On June 24, 1994, the Supreme Court decided Dolan v. City of
Tigard,3 5 overruling the Oregon Supreme Court and creating a new
test for determining the constitutional validity of land use develop-
ment exactions. However, before f6rmulating the new require-
ment, the Court addressed some preliminary constitutional issues
26. Brief for the United States, supra note 10, at 6.
27. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.825(1) (1993) (charging the Land Use Board of Appeals
with the initial review of local government land use decisions).
28. U.S. CONSr. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
29. OR. REv. STAT. § 197.829 (1993) (establishing the criteria for analysis of local
governments' comprehensive plans and land use regulations by the Land Use Board of
Appeals); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983) (establishing the "reasonable rela-
tionship" test in Oregon).
30. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
31. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993).
32. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
33. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 443.
34. Id
35. 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2315-16 (1994).
[Vol. 14:215
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in order to establish the foundation and justification for its new
rul. These issues included whether the Takings Clause is the ap-
propriate vehicle for examining development exactions; whether
Dolan is distinguishable from other land use cases; and whether the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should apply.
1. The Takings Clause Versus Substantive Due Process.
The threshold constitutional question the Court had to settle
was whether this case was governed by the Takings Clause or by the
substantive due process guarantee. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, asserted that the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment applies by way of the Fourteenth Amendment to all of
the states. He cited Chicago,.Baltimore & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chi-
cago6 as authority for this proposition, but several other recent
takings cases also furnish strong support for this position."7 How-
ever, indicative of the deep division among members of the Court,
Justice Stevens in his dissent challenged even this re-plowing of old
ground, stating that Chicago, B & Q made "no mention of either
the Takings Clause or the Fifth Amendment."ss RatherJustice Ste-
vens suggested, Chicago, B & Q was grounded in substantive due
process.39 Although he conceded that "[1]ater cases have inter-
preted the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive protection
against uncompensated deprivations of private property by the
States as though it incorporated the text of the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause," ' he argued that "[t~he so-called 'regulatory tak-
ings' doctrine that the Holmes dictum kindled has an obvious kin-
ship with the line of substantive due process cases that Lochner
exemplified."4 Justice Stevens concluded that "[besides having
36. 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) ("The legislature may prescribe a form of procedure to
be observed in the taking of private property for public use, but it is not due process of law
if provision be not made for compensation.").
37. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 829,834, 841 (1987)
(holding that imposition of a condition on a building permit that had po essential nexus to
the legitimate governmental objective put forth as the reason for the condition violates the
Fifth Amendment); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481
n.10 (1987) (stating that the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City. 438 U.S. 104,122 (1978)
(stating that the Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the FourteenthAmendment).38. ADolamn 114 S. Ct. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 2327.
40. Id.
41. Id. The "Holmes dictum" to which Justice Stevens referred appears in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922), in whichJustice Holmes stated, 'The
1995]
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similar ancestry, both doctrines are potentially open-ended sources
of judicial power to invalidate state economic regulations:" 42 Jus-
tice Stevens apparently feared that the majority's reliance on the
Takings Clause concealed a wolf in sheep's clothing-that the ma-
jority's interpretation of the Takings Clause represented a dis-
guised return to the Lochner era.
During the Lochner era, the courts, in deciding challenges to
state regulations, used the flexible substantive due process doctrine
to apply heightened scrutiny to economic legislation, thus holding
many exercises of state police power unconstitutional.43 The Court
later invalidated this unlimited source of judicial power, and the
Takings Clause emerged as the governing doctrine in the context
of regulatory takings.The Takings Clause is the more specific constitutional com-
mandment, and it allows for more flexible remedies. Professor
McCarthy, in analyzing the two doctrines, advocates use of the Tak-
ings Clause:
While deference to the legislature may not be the hallmark of
developing takings jurisprudence, it may be at root the raison
d'etre for invoking the Takings Clause. But as we look at the mat-
ter today, it is not the only reason. The Court may be in this area,
as in so many other matters, the stabilizer of the pendulum which
historically swings from near-extreme to near-extreme. When
government land regulation was minimal and largely undebat-
able, the Court was unlikely to uphold the landowner's challenge.
When, as the pendulum has swung, government regulation has
become dramatically more intrusive on the choices available to a
property owner-indeed, when it has combined with the growing
impact of private government-the'Court has become more sen-
sitive to the individual's need for counterweight. For both of
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking"; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484 (1987) (explaining why this statement is dicta). Loch-
ner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating an economic regulation on substantive
due process grounds), is generally recognized as the high point in the Court's use of the
substantive due process doctrine to check the states' ability to regulate economic activity.
42. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding that a resi-
dential zoning ordinance inhibiting private land use for business and industrial develop-,
ment violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the health, safety,
convenience, or general welfare of the part of the city affected will not be promoted);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (establishing Holmes' severe eco-
nomic loss test: the more drastic the diminution in value of the property, the more likely a
taking is to be found). But seeVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(upholding the constitutionality of zoning to prevent harmful uses).
W61O. 14:215
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these purposes, the subtleties of due process may not work. 44
Additionally, recent cases show that the use of substantive due pro-
cess is disfavored and the Takings Clause is preferred as the appro-
priate-constitutional doctrine for testing the validity of land use
regulations.' The danger, however, lies in the content of the test
used under the Takings Clause; that is, what level of scrutiny ap-
plies to government actions in the land use regulatory context. In
Dolan, the majority inappropriately used a form of heightened
scrutiny.
2. Distinguishing Dolan from Cases Involving Land Use
Regulations of General Applicability.
Before moving to the justifications for applying a kind of strict
scrutiny under the Takings Clause, the Court had to distinguish
Dolan from a long line of cases involving zoning and other land use
regulations of general applicability which applied a lower constitu-
tional standard of review.4 The majority gave two reasons why the
government action at issue in Dolan should be treated differently-
first, the City's decision was adjudicative rather than legislative; and
second, the conditions imposed on the permit included the grant-
ing of easements, which the Court viewed as more intrusive than
44- DavidJ. McCarthyJr., Ruminations On Rtgulation and the Takings Camse, in Ho.m
RuLE AND CIVIL Socilma 27, 73 (The Local Public Entity Study Organization No. 5, 1994)
(citations omitted).
45. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding that
a state law which denies a property owner all "economically viable use of his land" violates
the Takings Clause); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.. 825 (1987) (holding
that state exercise of police power in land use regulation must further an appropriate
governmental purpose to avoid violating the Takings Clause); Ke)itone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding that a state regulation requiring the
preservation of the "support estate" of certain properties was not a violation of the Takings
Clause); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (holding that a city zoning ordi-
nance substantially advancing legitimate government goals without depriving the owner of
all of the property's economic benefit does not violate the Takings Clause).
46. See general/yYee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (finding no taking
because the regulation did not constitute a permanent physical occupation of property);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (upholding state
statute requiring 50% of coal beneath certain structures be kept in place to provide surface
support because diminution of value of land Aas insufficient to constitute a taking); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (upholding a city action
preventing electric company from using its property for a nuclear reactor site through
rezoning and open space requirements since the landowner ias not deprived of all benefi-
cial use); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (upholding a city zoning ordinance
which created density restrictions in residential areas since it did not deprive owner of all
economic benefit); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (sustaining
a zoning ordinance that created residential districts and business districts notwithstanding
75% reduction in land value).
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mere limitations on use. As a result, the Court argued that the
City's action should be subject to greater constitutional examina-
tion. However, both of these lines of reasoning are defective.
First, the Court argued that the decision whether to grant a
building permit is an administrative one, and thus should be re-
garded as an "adjudicative decision,"47 subject to greater scrutiny
than legislative acts of general applicability. The Court reasoned
that a building permit applies to a specific piece of property and
therefore should be subject to a stricter test.48 Zoning ordinances,
on the other hand, are legislative acts of general applicability, that
should rightfully be afforded deference by the courts.49
This argument fails because in reality there are numerous cases
involving ordinances of general applicability that by their terms re-
quire dedications in connection with approval of subdivision plats.
Often, these decisions are indistinguishable in legal principle from
cases involving building permit applications.50 For example, there
is no difference to the individual property owner between a regula-
tion imposed by ordinance that exacts subdivision land for schools
and parks, and a regulation imposed by building officials pursuant
to land use legislation that exacts property for flood control. In
fact, in this author's experience, the process of working with local
officials to obtain a building permit has a salutary flexibility that
zoning ordinances generally do not.
The Court's second argument for treating Dolan differently
than other land use regulation cases was that the conditions re-
quired a dedication rather than a mere limitation on use. In the
Court's view, this required a closer look at the City's actions."1 The
fallacy of this argument is that limitations on use can actually have
a far greater impact on the property owner than permanent ease-
ments. For example, consider a comparison of Dolan with Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal CounciL5 2 In Dolan, although the landowner
was required to dedicate ten percent of her property to the City,
most of that was in the floodplain. In addition, the City promised
47. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
48. Md.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Call v. City of WestJordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (upholding a gen-
eral ordinance requiring either a dedication of seven percent of proposed subdivision land
to th6 city or an equivalent cash payment to be used for flood control and/or park and
recreation facilities for the benefit of city residents).
51. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
52. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
[Vol: 14:215
HeinOnline  -- 14 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 224 1995
TAKIVGS LAW
to improve the storm drainage system, an act that undoubtedly
would benefit Mrs. Dolan. (Indeed, Mrs. Dolan never argued that
she suffered any reduction in the value of her property.) In Lucqs,
however, the contested regulation imposed a limitation on use that
ess'entially prohibited the landowner from building at all on his en-
vironmentally fragile beachfront property. This severe limitation
on his use of the property resulted in its total diminution in
value.5 3 This comparison suggests that no greater constitutional
protection is needed just because a conditional requirement on a
building permit involves a dedication of land as opposed to a limi-
tation on its use. Indeed, regulations limiting land uses can be far
more draconian in their impact. 4
3. Unconstitutional Conditions.
The Court faltered next by relying on and misapplying "the
well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' "55 which
posits that the government cannot impose conditions on benefits it
confers in such a way as to infringe upon rights protected by the
Constitution. This principle arose from two First Amendment
cases,56 but has been extrapolated to apply to Fifth Amendment
takings cases as well.57
In applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Dolan,
53. Id at 2890.
54. The author is not suggesting that an actual physical taking should not require
compensation. Se gmerally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
439 (1982) (using the "permanent, physical invasion" test to find that even a small televi-
sion cable installed against a building owner's wishes is a compensable taking); United
States v. Causby, 328.U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that excessive noise and activity of military
airfield deprived property owner of beneficial use of his land resulting in an involuntary
easement being taken by the government and requiring compensation).
55. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
56. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that failure to renew a profes-
sor's contract may violate the First Amendment if the employer based its decision on the
professor's speech activities); Pickering v. Board of Educ. of tp. High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S.
563 (1968) (holding that a school board may not dismiss a teacher for speaking critically of
a school board policy).
57. SeeNollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). This extrapolation
is not without its critics, however. In Dolan, Justice Stevens asserted that the 'unconstitu-
tional conditions" doctrine is the wrong way to analyze Dolan and other takings cases be-
cause the analysis of what constitutes conditioning of a benefit in such a way as to "infringe
constitutionally protected interests" is different in the free speech context than in the tak-
ings context. 114 S. Ct. at 2328 (StevensJ., dissenting). Moreover,Justice Stevens pointed
out that "the 'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine has... long suffered from notoriously
inconsistent application; it has never been an overarching principle of constitutional law
that operates with equal force regardless of the nature of the rights and powers in ques-
tion." Id. at 2328 n.12.
19951
HeinOnline  -- 14 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 225 1995
226 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL. LAWJOURNAL
Rehnquist explained that one may not be required to surrender a
constitutional right-in this instance the right to just compensa-
tioli guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment-in return for "a discre-
tionary benefit conferred by the government where the property
sought has little or no relationship to the benefit."58 Rehnquist's
pronouncement invoked the doctrine of Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n; however, Nollan did not focus on the discretionary benefit
itself, but rather on the impact of the discretionary benefit. 9 In
Nollan, the issue was not that the discretionary benefit-permission
to build a new and larger house on the beach-was unrelated to
the exaction of the coastline easement. Rather, the problem in
Nollan was that the impact of the discretionary benefit-blocking
the view to the beach and to the ocean-was unconnected to the
permit condition. Similarly, in Dolan the discretionary benefit-
permission to build a new and much larger store-has no logical
relationship to the dedication of the easements for flood control
and a bike path. However, the impacts of the discretionary benefit
in Dolan-exacerbated flood problems and greater traffic conges-
tion-are meticulously related to the permit condition. Therefore,
Rehnquist's use of the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" is
inapposite.
The Court then applied the Nollan "nexus test"6 0 to the City's
exactions. Very quickly and quite properly, the Court concluded
that there was no nexus problem in Dolan.61 Enhancing flood con-
trol and reducing traffic congestion are obviously, logically, and
directly connected to the dedications required by the City.
Preventing construction and building a drainage system in the
floodplain are closely'related to reducing flooding along Fanno
'Creek., Similarly, facilitating alternative modes of transportation is
an essential element of mitigating traffic congestion.62
Mrs. Dolan's primary contention was that since the City failed
58. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
59. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838.
60. The "nexus test" states that a condition on a building permit must have an essen-
tial nexus to the legitimate governmental objective put forth as justification for the condi-
tion. I at 841.
61. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317-18.
62. See OR. ADMIN. R. 660-15-000(12) (1983) ("A transportation plan shall (1) con-
sider all modes of transportation including mass transit, air, water, pipeline, rail, highway,
bicycle and pedestrian ... ."); TiGARD, OR., COMPREHENSVE PLAN [1-221] 1 (5) ("Bicycle
and pedestrian pathway systems will result in some reduction of automobile trips within the
community. These modes of travel could replace short vehicle trips for shopping
purposes.").
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to identify any "special quantifiable burdens"6 caused by her new
construction, -or any "special benefits"64 received by her, the re-
quired exactions were unjustified. The City's public use justifica-
tion, which easily satisfied the Nollan nexus requirement, should
have disposed of Mrs. Dolan's arguments. Instead, the Court
elected to fashion a new constitutional doctrine for determining
whether a taking has occurred. This new standard goes far beyond
the "essential nexus" test articulated in Nollan.
Ill. ROUGH PROP'ORTIONALI . Ti NEw CONSTTUTIONAL
STANDARD FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS
The new regulatory takings standard announced in Dolan re-
quires that in addition to showing an essential nexus between the
permit conditions and "legitimate state interests,"m the City's find-
ings concerning the impacts of the project must be constitutionally
adequate to justify the proposed conditions.6 Relying entirely on
state court decisions,"7 the Dolan majority chose "rough propor-
tionality," a vague, ambiguous, and unquantifiable term, as the
standard against which to measure constitutional adequacy. Rough
proportionality represents a groundbreaking and disturbing devel-
opment in Fifth Amendment takingsjurisprudence. The new doc-
trine departs from established precedent and fails to resolve several
critical questions.
The Court determined that a new standard was necessary to ad-
dress the question, left open in Nollan, of "the required degree of
63. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
64. 1&
65. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
66. Dolan, -114 S. Ct. at 2318.
67. See Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976) (holding that a
statute authorizing municipalities to require subdividers to dedicate land or pay equivalent
fees for'parks and playgrounds was a valid delegation of powers and within the scope of
enabling legislation); Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980) (hold-
ing that a city ordinance requiring dedication of 40-foot right-of-way to be used at some
indefinite time in the future was "land-banking and violated the state constitution because
there was no reasonable nexus with the property owner's projected construction); City of
College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984) (holding that the city
had the power to enact and enforce an ordinance requiring either a park land dedication
or a fee in lieu as a condition of approval of subdivision plat); Call v. City of WestJordan,
606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (upholding an ordinance requiring dedication of seven percent
of proposed subdivision land to the city or payment of the equivalent of that value in cash
to be used for flood control and/or park and recreation facilities for the benefit of the
city's citizens);Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965) (hold-
ing that an ordinance requiring dedication of land for school, park, or recreational sites as
a condition of approval of subdivision plat was a reasonable exerdse of the police power).
1995]
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connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the
proposed development."68 After reviewing the City's findings re-
garding Mrs. Dolan's proposed development, the majority turned
to -"representative" state court decisions, claiming that "state courts
have been dealing with this question a good deal longer than we
have."6 9 The state courts, however, disagreed on the appropriate
standard, and were split among three different tests: (1) the ra-
tional nexus test; (2) the specific and uniquely attributable test;
and (3) the reasonable relationship test. So the Court reviewed
each of them. It found the rational nexus requirement of "very
generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the
required dedication and the proposed development ... too lax"
for the Fifth Amendment." On the other hand, the Court found
the "specific and uniquely attributable" test too exacting. 71 In-
stead, the Court adopted the intermediate "reasonable relation-
ship" test used by the majority of states.72 However, the Court
replaced the term "reasonable relationship" with "rough propor-
tionality," purportedly to clarify that the new test requires more
than minimal scrutiny,'3 but in reality extending the new standard
far beyond its origin.
In describing "rough proportionality," Rehnquist stated, "No
precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development."74 Had the Chief Justice left out two
words-and extent-from his formulation, he would not have
changed existing takings law; requiring a city's exaction to be re-
lated in nature to the construction's anticipated impact is merely a
restatement of the Nollan essential nexus test. Distilled to its es-
sence, the new constitutional requirement of "rough proportional-
ity" becomes an exercise in quantifying the extent or degree of the
connection between the imposed condition and the anticipated
impact of the project.
68. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317 (emphasis added).
69. Id at 2318.
70. Id. at 2318-19.
71. Id. The "specifically and uniquely attributable" test was set forth in Pioneer Trust
& Say. Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961) (stating that an
exaction is permissible if the burden on the subdivider is, specifically and uniquely attribu-
table to his activity).
72. Id.; see also supra note 67.
73. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
74. Id.
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However, the Court left several questions unanswered. For in-
stance, it is unclear whether any presumption of constitutional va-
lidity attaches to legislative or administrative actions taken
pursuant to laws'validly enacted and executed with proper proce-
dures,75 even those that, like the exactions in Dolan, have already
passed the Nollan nexus tesL It is also unclear whether or not any
benefit to the property owner should be taken into account in de-
ciding if the action passes the new quantitative test. In Dolan, the
Court focused solely on the loss of Mrs. Dolan's right to exclude
the public from the dedicated property. The majority made no
mention of the potential benefits to Mrs. Dolan: better flood con-
trol, reduced traffic congestion, and satisfaction of open space and
landscaping requirements. Furthermore, in defining what consti-
tutes distinct property for takings law purposes, the Court ap-
peared to retreat from its earlier decisions in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 76 Keystone Bitim inous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis,77 Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Con-
struction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern CaHfornia78 and Andrus v.
Allard79 These cases established a ratio for determining whether a
regulation constituted a taking in which the effect of the exaction
on the landowner is the numerator and the landowner's total prop-
75. The City's actions in Dolan were taken pursuant to the CDC and followed all
proper procedures. The City allows an applicant for a building permit to seek a variance in
order "to gain changes to otherwise mandatory Code requirements" under CDC § 18.134.
Brief for Respondent, supra-pote 10, at 14. In general, the variance device is "intended to
provide for a ste-specific, case-by-case analysis of special circumstances [surrounding a
building plan or development] and to allow far modification of the standards to address
those circumstances." Id. The City Council determined that Mrs. Dolan had failed to show
that her variance request satisfied the required criteria for approval of her application. It
is notable that Mrs. Dolan failed to allege any procedural error or irregularities as to the
City Council's decision regarding her variance request. Id.
76. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that although owners were unable to develop the
air space above the terminal, the ';alue of the entire parcel, notjust the air space, must be
considered in determining whether a compensable taking has occurred).
77. 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) ("[Our test for regulatory taking requires us to com-
pare the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the
property....").
78. 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993) (stating that the relevant question is whether the part
taken is the entire parcel in question or only a portion of it, and rejecting the takings claim
even though the part of the property that was taken was taken completely, leaving no
beneficial use for that portion).
79. 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (upholding the denial of the right to sell protected eagle parts
obtained before the Bald Eagle Protection Act was enacted, because the bundle of rights
must be viewed in its entirety and this regulation merely destroyed one strand in that
bundle).
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erty is the denominator.8 0
. Dolan fallaciously replaces the "total property" component of
the ratio with that portion of the property actually taken. Thus,
under Dolan, a landowner will always argue that his or her entire
property interest was taken without any reference to the portion of
the property that remains unaffected by the regulation. This calcu-
lated break from precedent means that the Dolan majority would
always find a taking when the regulation removes all economic
value from any portion of the property.
In addition to redefining what comprises an owner's property
for takings law purposes, the Court also gave no guidelines for
measuring the quantitative aspect of the rough proportionality
standard. It is clear that if a regulation deprives an owner of all
economic benefit, just compensation must be paid.8 ' However, af-
ter Dolan, it would seem that a building permit condition requiring
a dedication for public use amounting to ten percent of a land-
owner, s property could constitute an uncompensated taking. Ideo-
logically driven, the Court arrived at this position irrespective of
the real economic impact on the landowner;" irrespective of any
benefits the landowner received in exchange for the condition; ir-
respective of the commercial nature of the undertaking, in which,
unlike-in Nollan,'privacy is not so vital and public access is; and
irrespective of the government's authority to deny a permit alto-
gether rather than grant it with conditions.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens attacked the "doctrinal underpin-
nings" " of the majority's decision because the state cases relied on
80. Cf Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of Just Compensation-Law, 80 HAav. L. REv. 1165, 1190-93 (1967). Michelman ana-
lyzes the impact of land use regulation on the diminution in value of property rights
through a fractional expression. The loss in value of the affected property comprises the
numerator and the value of the total rights that are invaded by regulation is the
denominator.
81. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding that a
state law prohibiting construction on a barrier island was a regulatory taking that denied
the property owner all "economically viable use of his land" and required just compensa-
tion); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (holding that city zoning ordinances
creating density restrictions in residential areas did not deprive owner of all economic
benefit of the land and therefore did not constitute a taking); see also Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that the city's landmark preservation
statute, which prohibited Grand Central Terminal from building upward due to its status
as a "landmark site," did not require just compensation because courts must focus'on the
interference of rights in the entire parcel).
82. Mrs. Dolan did not argue that the original dedication would have had a negative
impact on the value of her property.
83. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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by the Court "either fail to support or decidedly undermine the
Court's conclusions in key respects." 84 Unlike Dolan, these state
cases all take into account gains, not just losses, to the property
owner from the permit conditions. Additionally, rather than focus-
ing on one portion of the property, the state cases look at the en-
tire transaction and emphasize the relationship between the
burden of the condition and the entire parcel. Moreover, the
Supreme Court itself made it clear in Keystone that an exact correla-
tion between burdens and benefits is not necessary:
The Takings Clause has never been read to require the States
or the courts to calculate whether a specific individual has suf-
fered burdens under this generic rule in excess of the benefits
received. Not every individual gets a full dollar return in benefits
for the 'axes he or she pays; yet, no one suggests that an individ-
ual has a right to compensation for the difference between taxes
paid and the dollar value of benefits received.a
The Dolan majority offered no more by way ofjustification for
its new constitutional doctrine. Critical analysis reveals that the
Court used certain state court cases as the constitutional founda-
tion of its new requirement;16"yet these cases do not come close to
84. Id. at 2323.
85. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.21 (1987).
86. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Rehnquist explicitly re-
jected the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test as primary support for the Dolan
decision, stating that "[w]e think the 'reasonable relationship' test adopted byamajority of
the state courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
However, upon close examination, the five cases that Rehnquist cited as espousing the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" standard are the strongest state cases that could
have supported Rehnquist's new doctrine. Yet the following analysis shows that even these
cases do not support "rough proportionality."
In Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Il. 1961), in
which an ordinance required the dedication of at least one acre for each 60 building sites,
the court declared that the exactions must be "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the
need created by the proposed subdivision. But nowhere in the decision did the Illinois
court say that the burden of proof should be on the village. The case was decided on an
agreed set of facts showing only that the community's school facilities were near capacity.
Id. However, Rehnquist, in Dolan, read-this decision to require the local government to
"demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the specifically created need."
Dolan, 114 S. Ct at 2319.
InJ.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12 (N.H. 1981), in which the court
invalidated a blanket requirement of 7.5% of the subdivider's land for playground or other
town use, there was no suggestion that it was the local government's burden to prove that
the conditions attached to approval of the subdivision application were directly related to a
specific need created by the proposed development.
In Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Wayne, 334 A.20l 30 (N.J. 1975), which con-
cerned off-site improvements on land not owned by the subdivider, the New Jersey
Supreme Court properly required the planning agency to estimate, "with the aid of the
municipal engineer and such other persons having pertinent information or expertise (a)
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requiring what the Court now requires in Dolan. Moreover, at the
heart of the new doctrine of "rough proportionality" is the need to
quantify the extent of the connection between the imposed condi-
tion and the impact of the development; this quantification, as we
the cost of the [off-site] improvement and (b) the amount by which all properties to be
serviced ihereby, including the subdivision propertywill be specially benefited therefrom."
Id. at 40. Thus, in order to determine how to finance the off-site improvement, Divan
articulated the "fair share" method, based on the benefits the subdivider and various par-
ties receive from the off-site improvement. Id. at 41. With respect to off-site improve-
ments, the developer or subdivider may have no choice but to rely on information and
facts obtainable only by the local government, especially where, as in most cases, the local
government itself will be doing the construction. As a practical matter, putting this burden
on local government is proper. But this is a far cry from requiring local government to
justify conditions on building permits when the property owner is doing the construction
on his or her own land. Therefore, Rehnquist's citation to this case as supporting the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" standard is dubious.
In McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 270 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio 1971), the Ohio Court
of Appeals reversed the denial of a subdivision application. The denial was predicated
upon the city's demand for a land dedication in order to widen a road at the south end of
appellant's property, while the subdivision was at the north end, iome 700 feet away, and
fronting on another street. The Ohio court quite properly said, "There is no logical basis
... for this distortion of the meaning of the word 'subdivision.'" Id. at 373. Thus, the
highway widening requirement was held to be "completely inapplicable and unrelated" to
appellants' subdivision. Id. The court did say that a city may require a developer to "pro-
vide streets that are necessitated by the activity within the subdivision and.., to assume any
costs which are specifically and uniquely attributable to his activities." Id. at 374. However,
this statement follows an explicit requirement that the subdivider must prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he or she has complied with all applicable state and city
regulations governing submission to the Plan Commission. Id. Again, the facts of this case
and the application of the law do not provide precedent for "rough proportionality," In-
stead, the facts merely demonstrate that the conditions failed to meet the Nollan nexus test.
In Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910 (R.I. 1970), the Rhode Island
Supreme Court invalidated the city's requirement that at least seven percent of the land to
be divided must be donated to the city for recreation purposes as a condition to final plat
approval. However, it recognized that such voluntary donations have universally been up-
held as a valid exercise by the legislature of its police power, and stated that the "natural
result of subdivision ... is an increased need in the community for recreation areas." Id. at
913.
The Rhode Island court also acknowledged that state supreme courts are divided as to
how the donation requirement should be effectuated. For example, it noted that Pioneer
held that the "subdivider "may be required to donate only such portion of the land to be
divided as may be needed for such public uses as will result from the activities specifically
and uniquely attributable to him." Id. (citations omitted). On the other hand, most of the
other state supreme court decisions have upheld the legislatively imposed percentage do-
nation, and theburden then rests on the developer to prove that the imposed percentage
is unriasonable. Id. (internal citation omitted). The Rhode island court opted for the
specifically and uniquely attributable standard, believing that the fixed percentage require-
ment would lead to inequities.
In summary, although the best possible support for "rough proportionality" comes
from the logically related "specifically and uniquely attributable" test, Divan and McKain
offer no real support for "rough proportionality," and Pioneer, J.ED., and Ansuini contra-
dict Dolan's shift in the burden of proof.
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will see, is nothing more than prediction based on estimate. Fur-
thermore, the Court eroded the established constitutional pre-
sumption of legislative validity. In addition, the Court refuted the
very state cases on which it relied by disregarding the benefits de-
rived by the property owner in exchange. Finally, the Court so nar-
rowed the concept in the takings context of what constitutes a
separate segment of property as to render the inquiry absurd. Alto-
gether,' the result is to invite potentially endless litigation in the
future, much of which will be trivial. Tennyson's "silvery gossa-
mers"8 7 have greater weight than does "rough proportionality."
IV. THiE APPLICATION OF ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY TO THE
FAcTs OF DOrAN
If the establishment of the "rough proportionality" standard is a
misjudgment, its application to the facts of Dolan would have con-
stituted dear reversible error had it been a lower court decision.
The new test shifts the burden of proof to local officials to justify
quantitatively the conditions they impose on building permits. In
this case, both the floodplain easement and the pedestrian/bicycle
path easement were casualties of a misguided attempt by the ma-
jority to apply bright line rules to circumstances better analyzed by
balancing factors on a case-by-case basis.
A. The Floodplain Easement
The ChiefJustice first addressed the floodplain easement exac-
tion to determine whether the findings relied on by the City met
the standard of "rough proportionality." Rehnquist conceded that
Mrs. Dolan's proposed construction would increase the quantity
and rate of stormwater run-off into Fanno Creek and that the City
had the authority to prevent her from building in the floodplain.s8
He then added, "But the city demanded more-it not only wanted
petitioner not to build in the floodplain, but it also wanted peti-
tioner's property along Fanno Creek for its Greenway system."9 At
this point in the decision, the Court throws the baby out with the
floodwater. The City's purpose was not toprevent Mrs. Dolan from
building in the floodplain-she never had such a right 0 Instead,
87. AFRE LORD TENNysON, In Menodam A.H.H., in SELECTED PoEm OF TENISoN
147, 155 (Douglas Bush ed., 1951).
88. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2809, 2320 (1994).
89. Id.
90. The land found in the 100-year floodplain is defined as 'sensitive land.* DC,
1995] TAM!NGS LAW
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the City wanted a dedicated easement so that it could take appro-
priate steps to improve the storm drainage system along Fanno
Creek.9 The City needed the easement so that it could later build
a channel at its own expense. The fact that the Court, in such an
important case, could fail to address the City's primary purpose for
its exaction lends credence to the conclusion that the result was
predetermined.
Assuming arguendo that the City did not make its case for dedi-
cation of the floodplain and the exaction was approved, it would
still be, in Justice Stevens' words, "harmless error."92 Since Mrs.
Dolan could not use that portion of her land for construction in
any event, she would have benefited from (1) using that land to
satisfy the zoning code's fifteen percent open space requirement;
(2) not having to pay taxes and insurance on that part of her land;
and (3) not having to build, at her own expense, an on-site
stormwater run-off catch basin or other facility to prevent surface
water from flowing into the creek. In return, she would have given
supra note 9, § 18.84.010A ("Sensitive lands are lands potentially unsuitable for develop-
ment because of their location within the 100-year floodplain, within natural drainage-way,
within a wetland area, on steep slopes, or on unstable ground."). The permitted uses on
sensitive lands are as follows:
A. Except as provided by Subsection 18.84.015.B, the following uses are outright
permitted uses within sensitive land areas:
1. Accessory uses such as lawns, gardens, or play areas, except in wetlands;
2. Agricultural uses conducted without locating a structure'within the sensi-
tive land area, except in wetlands;
3. Community recreation uses such as bicycle and pedestrian paths or ath-
letic fields or parks, excluding structures, except in wetlands;
4. Public and private conservation areas for water, soil, open space, forest,
and wildlife resources;
5. Removal of poison oak, tansy ragwort, blackberry, or other noxious
vegetation;
6. Maintenance of floodway excluding rechanneling; and
7. Fences, except in the floodway area.
Id., § 18.84.015.A. "[A]lI other uses are prohibited on sensitive land areas." Id.
§ 18.84.015.E.
91. As the respondent noted in its brief:
The Fanno Creek drainage basin has experienced rapid urbanization over the
past 30 years causing a significant increase in stream flows after periods of precipi-
tation. The anticipated increased storm water flow from the subject property to
an already strained creek and drainage basin can only add to the public need to
manage the stream channel and floodplain for drainage purposes. Because the
proposed development's storm drainage would add to the need for public man-
agement of the Fanno Creek floodplain, the Commission finds that the require-
ment of dedication of the floodplain area on the site is related to the applicant's
plan to intensify development on the site.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 14 (citation omitted).
. 92. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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up the right to control the time and manner of excluding the pub-
lic from only ten percent of her property. Meanwhile, she was do-
ing everything in her power to attract the public to the other
ninety percent of her property. In short, the cost to Mrs. Dolan
was minimal relative to the benefits she received; surely this should
satisfy the requirement of rough proportionality. As Justice
Holmes aptly stated, "Government hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change .... "11
For the majority, the fatal defect arose in the City's stated pur-
pose of using Mrs. Dolan's property along Fanno Creek for a
greenway. As Rehnquist observed, "The city has never said why a
public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the
interest of flood control."94 Of course the City never said that:
there is 'i/o logical cohnection between a public greenway and
flood control. But his observation raises a nexus question that
could have been decided easily under Nollan's guidelines without
introducing-a new constitutional doctrine. On the merits, the City
made it abundantly ciear that the greenway purpose was incidental
to the purpose of flood control.95 Is the Court saying that every
stated purpose for conditioned approval of a building permit has
to satisfy the standard of rough proportionality? Should it not be
quite enough that the City's primary purpose meets the require-
menti In his dissent, Justice Souter argued that the incidental rec-
reational use should "stand or fall with the bicycle path."9"
B. The Pedestrian/Bicyce Pathway
The Court also misapplied its new constitutional doctrine to the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway. The City estimated that Mrs. Dolan's
new building would add 435 automobile trips per day to an already
93. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
94. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2820.
95. Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 37-38. The City's brief states:
Contrary to Petitioner's intimations, the City's findings make clear that the exac-
tion requiremerit primarily addresses flooding problems in Fanno Creek. Under
the City's plans, the greenspace and park benefits linked to the dedication are
secondary to the flood control purposes motivating the condition. The easement
dedication is necessary to address flooding concerns in the first instance. It is
only upon the creation of such an easement dedicated to flood control that the
City's park plans allows [sic] for joint recreational use, subordinating that use to
flood control concerns.
Id. at 38 (foomotes and citations omitted).
96. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2330 (SouterJ., dissenting).
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heavily conigested downtown.97 If that number appeared high,
Mrs. Dolan should have done her own traffic study and presented
her own evidence. However, the Court's problem with the ade-,
quacy of this finding was that the City only said that the bicycle
path, by providing an alternate mode of transportation, " 'could off-
set some of the traffic demand.'"" Rehnquist concluded this
point by stating, "No precise mathematical calculation is required,
but the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in sup-
port of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond
the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic de-
mand generated."99 To which Stevens replied, "The Court's rejec-
tion of the bike path condition amounts to nothing more than a
play on words";' 00 and Souter added, "[T]he City loses based on
one word ('could' instead of 'would')." 1°1
And so the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution comes down to this: if the City had pre-
dicted how many of the projected 435 additional automobile trips
would be reduced by cyclists and pedestrians using the new path,
the imposed condition would have satisfied the Constitution. How-
ever, it is axiomatic in land use planning that alternative modes of
transportation will reduce automobile traffic, and the Comprehen-
sive Plan, pursuant to which the City was acting, so stated. 10 2 What
would the Court have considered "roughly proportional," a reduc-
tion of ten automobile trips per day? Twenty? Has our Constitu-
tion really been reduced to this?
After Dolan, the Court requires predictions based on estimates.
However, as Justice Stevens pointed out, the Court should not
"micro-manage" the City's affairs 103 In Dolan, the Court showed a
complete lack of deference to a duly elected legislative body carry-
ing out validly enacted laws in scrupulous adherence to proper
procedures. Given the five "conservative" justices who comprised
the Dolan majority, this rather extreme example ofjudicial activism
is ironic, to say the least.
97. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321 n.9 ("The city uses a weekday average trip rate of 53,21
trips per 1000 square feet. Additional Trips Generated = 53.21 x (17,600-9720).").
98. Id. at 2321-22 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 2322.
100. Id. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2331 (Souter, J., dissenting).
102. See supra note 62.
103. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326.
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V. TiE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF DOLA"S SmFr IN THE Evm rTr.
BURoDFN OF PROOF
Dolan's new takings formulation and shift in the evidentiary
burden of proof will impose practical hardships on all parties in-
volved in city planning and private building, and will result in mas-
sive economic loss.
The negative impact of Dolan is best illustrated by a step-by-step
analysis of the building process. In almost all situations, the land-
owner/developer begins by engaging an architect and a civil engi-
neer to conduct a study of the land and to aicertain community
zoning and building code requirements."' The study first deter-
mines how many and what kind of houses or apartments will be
allowed in the proposed project. Likewise, in a commercial real
estate development, the study identifies the size and type of office
building or shopping center permissible under pertinent land use
regulations. 105 These architectural and civil engineering studies
are unique to each parcel of land. Invariably, the cynosure of these
initial studies is their impact analysis. 0 Given the unique charac-
ter of each parcel of land and each proposed development, as well
as the developer's need to ascertain as early as possible the cost of
104. This step is frequently taken prior to acquisition while the land is under option
or during a study period that serves as a condition subsequent to the land acquisition
contract.
105. The cases in this area fal into two basic factual categories: (1) the subdivision of
land, usually for residential purposes, ^ ag., Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 765 F.2d 756
(9th Cir. 1985) (holding that zoning ordinance may prohibit the best and most beneficial
use of the property); and (2) the proffer of a site plan for multi-family or commercial
projects, e ag., Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Hts., 949 F.2d 890 (6th Cr.
1992) (holding that property owner has a property right in prior zoning classification); Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that landowner must establish that city's actions in denying building permits was arbitrary
and irrational).
'106. Dolan involved two major impacts, vehicular traffic and surface water runoff.
Other typical development effects include pollution of air, water, and soil and increased
demand for schools, parks, and recreation areas. See genemy Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 28 F.Sd 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (prohibiting construction in wetlands held to
be a regulatory taking); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (remanding to determine the amount of loss of economic use and value as a result
of denial of Clean Water Act permit for limestone mining under wetlands, and whether
such loss is significant enough to comprise a regulatory taking); Hendler v. United States,
952 F.2d 1864 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that EPA's placement of groundwater monitoring
wells on private property, as part of its effort to combat groundwater pollution from an
adjacent hazardous waste site, was a taking); South Terminal Corp. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that EPA's regional air quality trans-
portation plan imposing a parking space freeze, which eliminated 1,100 parking spaces
planned by a corporation, did not constitute a taking).
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complying with regulations pertaining to anticipated impacts, it is
the landowner who is in the best position to determine the impacts
of his or her planned construction.
What purpose is served by shifting the evidentiary burden of
proof away from the party who is supposed to know every inch of
the land, its character and topography, its load-bearing capacity, its
water tables, its quirks and "personality"? What purpose is served
by shifting the burden away from the party who is in the best posi-
tion to know the nature of development impacts and the most effi-
cient methods of mitigating them?
There is a key time in the permitting process in every jurisdic-
tion when the government must decide whether to approve the
development, with or without conditions, and after which the city
can no longer impose conditions on a new development. In hous-
ing projects, the crucial time is either the preliminary or the final
plat approval. In other types of real estate developments, the deci-
sive moment is either. the preliminary or the final site plan ap-
proval. Following such approval, the building permit, which
requires compliance with fire, safety, and other construction re-
lated matters, should be readily obtainable. The next step, prepa-
ration of the plat or site plan and the building permit application,
involves the efforts of architects, engineers, contractors, appraisers,
lenders, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals. This prepa-
ration takes a great deal of time, effort, money, and expertise, so it
is necessary for the developer and the city to agree on the project
and any conditions before the developer proceeds to this step.
The entire impetus of the planned project emanates from the
owner; therefore, it is the owner's responsibility to anticipate po-
tential problems and their solutions. This is the "world" in which
developers and other property owners apply for governmental
approvals.
The subdivision plat or site plan typically is reviewed by a plan-
ning commission, which is an administrative body with the author-
ity to recommend approval, conditional approval, or denial of the
submission. Final approval is often reserved for the city council or
other elected body. The approval process takes at best .three
months; for a major development it often requires six months, and
may well drag on for a year or more. Most communities are
strapped financially, and many local governments are understaffed.
This is the governmental context of the approval process.
Enter Dolan. Already understaffed city engineering depart-
[V'ol. 14:215
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ments and planning commissions will become even more bur-
dened. In the next twelve months, at least 1,600,000 applications
for building permits will demand attention. 10 7 Dolan now requires
local governments to make "some sort of individualized determina-
tion"108 that any condition imposed on the approval of a permit, a
plat, or a site plan be closely connected "both in nature and extent
to the impact of the proposed developmeit."109 Who will be there
to make the required findings? More city engineers? More city
traffic consultants? More city environmental experts? The inevita-
ble result will be denial, and if not denial, delay.
Denial of building permits that would -otherwise be condition-
ally approved serves no one-not the public, for whom millions of
jobs and hundreds of thousands of homes are the potential victims
of non-development, and certainly not landowners, who will find
property values depressed because of the added uncertainty associ-
ated with the ability to develop land to its highest and best use.
Delay is also insidious. Assume the following: (1) the average
approval time will increase by three months; and (2) the average
cost of land and other expenses incurred in the permitting process
is $200,000 per parcel. Multiplying 1,600,000 building permit sites
times $200,000 times the current interest rate (say, three months at
eight percent per annum) equals $6,400,000,000 wasted. Further,
this figure does, not include project overhead or increases in cost of
materials and labor, all of which add to economic inefficiency and
fall ultimately on the consumer. Building permit, plat, and site
plan delays and denials, the inevitable consequences of the Dolan
decision, translate into staggering economic loss.
These economic concerns are just the beginning. Delay and
denial will also spawn endless litigation. As local governments
struggle to cope with the new evidentiary burden, every dissatisfied
property owner becomes a potential plaintiff in a takings action.
Why not? Now that it is the government's burden to prove the
reasonableness of its imposed conditions, what does the property
owner have to lose? American society will rue the day and pay the
cost of the Supreme Court's rejection in Dolan of a long line of
cases in which it was the property owner's burden to prove the un-
reasonableness. of the exaction. 10
107. See CONSTRUGION REVIEV, supra note 6, at 15, 23.
108. Dolaa; 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
109. Id. at 2320.
110. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (plac-
ing burden on owner to demonstrate that a regulation was a taking); Pennell v. City of San
1995]
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How does the Dolan majorityjustify such fundamental changes
in firmly entrenched constitutional presumptions involving the po-
lice power? In. one breathtaking footnote the Chief Justice wrote:
Justice Stevens' dissent takes us to task for placing the burden
on the city to justify the required dedication. He is correct in
arguing that in evaluating most generally applicable zoning regu-
lations, the burden properly rests on the party challenging the
regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of
property rights.' Here, by contrast, the city made an adjudicative
decision to condition petitioner's application for a building per-
mit on an individual parcel. In this situation, the burden prop-
erly rests on the city. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.111
The quote and the reference to.Nollan are the onlyjllstifications for
the crucial shift in the evidentiary burden of proof. However,
there is, simply no language on page 836 of Nollan, nor anywhere
else in the Nollan decision, that justifies the Dolan majority on this
extremely important point!
Conditioning the application for a building permit on a single
piece of land-what Rehnquist labeled the "adjudicative deci-
sion"-is nothing more than what municipalities have done count-
less times, particularly in subdivision situations. In the subdivision
cases,1 2 the fact that the condition may be required by an ordi-
nance of general applicability, rather than being imposed as a con-
dition on a specific building permit, hardly supports the disparate
treatment accorded the City of Tigard. The City's conditions were
mandated by the CDC"1 3 and correctly applied through the proce-
dural mechanism of deciding whether to grant a requested vari-
ance.1 4 Furthermore, over and over again, the cases have carefully
Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (placing burden on the landlord to prove that city rent control
ordinance constituted a taking); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedicds, 480 U.S.
470 (1987) (placing burden on coal company to prove that law requiring 50% of the coal
beneath a certain structure be kept in place to provide surface support was a taking); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (placing burden on prop-
erty owners); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (placing burden on landown-
ers); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (placing burden on shopping
center owner); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (placing
burden on owner of Grand Central Terminal); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)
(placing burden of proof on owners of trees cut down by state order); Village of Euclidv
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (placing burden on real estate company); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (placing burden on unlawful manufacturer of intoxicating
liquors to prove that prohibitory state liquor laws constituted a taking).
111. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320 n.8 (citation omitted).
112. See supra note 105.
113. See CDC, supra note 9, § 18.84.040A.1-7.
114. See CDC, supra note 9, § 18.134.
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refrained from shifting the burden of proof to the local govern-
ment. 1" 5 Even in the cases that found the ordinance or the condi-
tion to be invalid, the usual presumption of the constitutionality of
police power action was left intact. Justice Souter, dissenting in the
'Dolan decision, wrote, "[I] t appears that the Court has placed the
burden of producing evidence of relationship on the city, despite
the-usual rule in cases involving the police power that the govern-
ment is presumed to have acted constitutionally."11 6
Justice Stevens agreed that the majority wrongly shifted the bur-
den of proof. His concluding paragraph says it all and says it with
poignancy:
In our changing world one thing is certain: uncertainty will
characterize predictions about the impact of new urban develop-
ments on the risks of floods, earthquakes, traffic congestion, or
environmental harms. When there is doubt concerning the mag-
nitude of those impacts, the public interest in averting them must
outweigh the private interest of the commercial entrepreneur. If
the government can demonstrate that the conditions it has im-
posed in a land-use permit are rational, impartial and conducive
to fulfilling the aims of a valid land-use plan, a strong presump-
tion of validity should attach to those conditions. The burden of
demonstrating that those conditions have unreasonably impaired
the economic value of the proposed improvement belongs
squarely on the shoulders of the party challenging the state ac-
tion's constitutionality. That allocation of burdens has served us
well in the past. The Court has stumbled badly today by reversing
it.117
VI. PEVmv rnG PAST TAiN'GS CASES iN IGHT OF DoLAv
To illustrate the radical departure of the Dolan decision from
established precedent, this section compares its holding to five
landmark Supreme Court and state court decisions. Through this
lens, the ill-conceived nature of Dolan is clear. Indeed, if the Dolan
standard had applied to these five cases, each would have been
overturned with a finding that the government unconstitutionally
interfered with property rights and committed a taking. In short,
analysis of these cases demonstrates that Dolan effectively reverses
decades of sound federal and state takingsjurisprudence-some of
which, ironically, the Dolan majority purported to follow.
115. See supra note 110.
116. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2331 (SouterJ., dissenting).
117. IR. at 2329-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A. Dolan Marks a Clear Departure from Supreme Court Precedent
The dramatic changes imposed by Dolan are highlighted by ex-
amining three prior Supreme Court decisions. Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead'18 stated that parties challenging the validity of a munici-
pal ordinance have the burden of proving that the ordinance is
unconstitutional. Dolan shifts this burden 180 degrees. Hadacheck
v. Sebastian"19 announced judicial deference to a city's exercise of
its police power. Dolan abolishes this deference. Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis'2 ° identified the entire property as
the benchmark against which a taking should be measured. Dolan
focuses only on the severed interest, thus rendering almost any
land use restriction a taking. Each of these cases will be discussed
in turn.
1. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.
Goldblatt involved a town ordinance that affected only the appel-
lants. The ordinance placed restrictions on certain kinds of dredg-
ing and pit excavations and required private property owners to
obtain a permit in order to continue excavation activities. -12 ' Ap-
pellant property owners argued that the ordinance completely pro-
hibited their business operations and thus constituted an
uncompensated taking." Applying a presumption of constitution-
ality, the Court held that no taking had occurred despite the fact
that the ordinance deprived the appellant of the property's most
beneficial use. Justice Clark, writing for a unanimous Supreme
Court,123 stated the issue thus:
The question, therefore, narrows to whether the prohibition of
further excavation below the water table is a valid exercise of the
town's police power. The term "police power" connotes the time-
tested conceptional limit of public encroachment' upon private
interests. Except for the substitution of the familiar standard of
"reasonableness," this Court has generally refrained from an-
nouncing any specific criteria. The classic statement of the rule
in Lawton v. Steele is still valid today: "To justify the state in .
interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public.., require such interference;
118. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
119. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
120. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
121. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 869 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (citing HFIrASrAD,
N.Y., ORDINANcEs, § 130, No. 16 (as amended Nov. 25, 1958)).
122. Id at 591.
123. Justices Frankfurter and White took no part in the Goldblatt decision.
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and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the ac-
.complishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive uponindividuals."124
Relying on Lawton, the court in Goldblatt held that reasonable
interference in property rights by the government on behalf of
public interests is justified, so long as the interference does not
unduly oppress the individual."z  In other words, Goldblatt pre-
sumed that the ordinance -as constitutional and that the owner
had the evidentiary burden of establishing any loss of property
value. 126 Indeed, the government was not required to provide evi-
dence about either the possibility of less severe remedies or the
safety functions of the ordinance. In fact, Justice Clark postulated
that the section of the ordinance prohibiting the deepening of a
twenty-five-foot lake would have little, if any, effect on public
safety.' 2 7 But even if such a conclusion were drawn, it would not
render the ordinance unreasonable because, as Justice Clark
stated, "[F]or all we know, the ordinance may have a de minimis
effect on appellants. Our past cases leave no doubt that appellants
had the burden on 'reasonableness.' "128
Compare this established doctrine to the Dolan decision: Dolan
ignored the essential element-that the government restrictions
must "not [be] unduly oppressive upon individuals""-and de-
cided that as a general proposition, government interference is un-
justified unless the government can prove a quantified public
interest proportionate in both nature and extent to the property
owner's potential loss.'30 In Dolan, no evidence existed as to the
124. Id. at 594-95 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (alterations in
original) (citation omitted)).
125. Id at 594 (explaining that %e find no indication that the prohibitory effect of
Ordinance No. 16 is sufficient to render it an unconstitutional taking if it is otherwise a
valid police regulation"); see also Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 315 (1920)
(holding that a state may, "in the interest of the community;" limit a property right);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (reasoning that private interests in the
way of progress "must yield to the good of the community"); Reinman v. City of Little
Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915) (holding that "it is dearly within the police power of the
state.., to declare that in particular circumstances and in particular localities a livery
stable shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law, provided this power is not exerted
arbitrarily, or with unjust discrimination"); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662-63 (1887)
(reasoning that it is within the police power of the State to regulate the manufacture and
sale of intoxicating liquors).
"126. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 592.
127. Id. at 595.
128. Id at 596.
129. Id. at 595.
130. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. CL 2309, 2319-20 (1994).
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real economic impact of the City's conditions on Mrs. Dolan, nor
did she allege any financial harm caused by Tigard's exactions.
Moreover, the Rehnquist decision failed to address obvious poten-
tial benefits to Mrs. Dolan emanating from the City's demands.
Clearly, Dolan alters established constitutional doctrine by shift-
ing the burden of proof from landowner to government. If the
Dolan holding had been applied in Goldblatt, the Town of Hemp-
stead would have been required to establish the degree of connec-
tion between the ordinance's requirements and the impact of the
company's dredging operations. That alone would have resulted
in a finding of an unconstitutional taking because the ordinance
was of dubious value as a safety measure. Nevertheless, ChiefJus-
tice Warren andJustices Black, Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, and Bren-
nan alljoined justice Clark in holding that no taking had occurred.
These disparate results can be explained simply: Goldblatt relied on
constitutional precedent in assigning the burden of proof; Dolan
did not.
2. Hadacheck v. Sebastian.
If the Goldblatt decision would give the Dolan majority heart-
burn, the earlier Supreme Court case of Hadacheck v. Sebastian"'1
might well make them apoplectic. Hadacheck exemplified the
Supreme Court's traditional deference to local governments' po-
lice power in regulating land use. In this case, the Court held that
the City of Los Angeles could regulate certain activities on private
property, even if those regulations rendered the property almost
totally diminished in value.132
Mr. Hadacheck, the petitioner, purchased eight acres of land to
build and operate a brick factory. Seven years later, the City of Los
Angeles passed an ordinance making it unlawful to manufacture
brick within his district.133 Mr. Hadacheck argued that if the ordi-
131. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
132. The petitioner owned an eight-acre parcel of land containing an especially valu-
able kind of clay usable in the manufacture of high quality brick. The petitioner made
extensive excavations, erected kilns and other buildings, and installed expensive machin-
ery in the process of establishing a thriving brick manufacturing business. His property for
brick-making purposes was worth $800,000. For any other purpose its value was at most
$60,000, because the extensive excavations would have made any other use of the land
extremely difficult. In addition, the clay could not have been extracted and transported
elsewhere for brick-making in any economically viable sense. Id. at 404-06.
133. At the time of the ordinance, Los Angeles covered more than 107 square miles.
The particular district affected by the ordinance covered only three square miles, within
which was located one other brick yard operator. I. at 406.
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nance were upheld, it would deny him all use of his property. He
argued further that his business did not constitute a nuisance as it
emitted no noises, no noxious odors, and only minimal smoke.
During seven years of his brick-making operation, no nuisance-like
complaints had been filed against his business. Moreover, in other
districts in Los Angeles, brick yards were operating without similar
regulation.'3 Finally, Mr. Hadacheck argued that the ordinance
was unreasonable because "the means adopted are out of propor-
tion to the danger involved.""3 5 Indeed, "[tihe danger may be
slight and remote while the remedy--entire suppression-could
not be more drastic." 13 6
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court found that the
neighborhood around petitioner's property had been adversely af-
fected by Mr. Hadacheck's brick yard. The evidence, "when taken
in connection with the presumptions in favor of the propriety of
the legislative determination," 37 would not support invalidating
the ordinance on the ground that it was arbitrary or discrimina-
tory. Justice McKenna, writing for the Supreme Court, delivered a
unanimous opinion upholding the decision of the California
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court based its holding on the primacy of the
state's police power. It relied on Reinman v. City of Little Rock,"s
which held that a livery stable business could be declared a legal
nuisance under the special circumstances of the case, even though
not a nuisance per se.' 9 Justice McKenna declared the police
power to be "one of the most essential powers of government, one
that is the least limitable."" ° He further emphasized that "[there
must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the way
they must yield to the good of the community." 41 On these
grounds, the Los Angeles ordinance in Hadacheck was held not to
constitute a compensable taking.142 Answering the argument that
the ordinance denied the owner all economic benefit of his prop-
erty, Justice McKenna emphasized that the prohibition was only on
134. Id. at 406-07.
135. IM at 399.
136. Id. The petitioner also contended that carving out a three-square-mile district
was irrational and therefore discriminatory. Id.
137. FxparteHadacheck, 132 P. 584, 586 (Cal. 1913).
138. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
139. Id. at 176.
140. HadaceC* 239 U.S. at 410.
141. Id
142. Id. at 411.
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the manufacture of bricks and not on the removal of the brick clay,
even though the petitioner had alleged that the removal alone was
not economically feasible. 143 Justice McKenna's final words in the
Hadacheck opinion are illuminating:
It may be that something else than prohibition would have satis-
fied the conditions. Of this, however, we have no means of deter-
mining, and besides we cannot declare invalid the exertion of a
power which the city undoubtedly has because of a charge that it
does not exactly accommodate the conditions or that some other
exercise would have been better or less harsh. We must accord
good faith to the city in the absence of a clear showing to the
contrary.14
This language flies in the face of rough proportionality. Would
that the Dolan majority had heeded these words before establishing
its new constitutional doctrine!
Instead, undercutting state police power, Dolan places the onus
on municipal governments to justify duly enacted ordinances and,
further, to provide extensive documentation justifying their imple-
mentation. In effect, Dolan turns upside-down the hierarchy estab-
lished in Hadacheck that the good of the community stands above
private interests.
3. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis.
In a third case, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,'4 '
the Supreme Court found no taking in the application of the 1966
Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation
Act (the "Act").146 The holding in Keystone turned on the identity
and value of the property, or property right, allegedly taken by the
"Act.47 The Court noted that "Pennsylvania .recognizes three sepa-
rate estates in land: The -mineral estate; the surface estate; and the
143. Id. at 412.
144. Id. at 413-14.
145. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
146. Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, PA. STAr. ANN. tit, 52,
§ 1406.2 (Supp. 1986) (encompassing a comprehensive program to prohibit mining that
causes subsidence 'damage to public buildings, houses, or cemeteries existing on the date
the Act was passed). Keystone, an association of coal mine operators, brought this case
nearly 20 years later and attacked the Act on its face as an uncompensated regulatory
* taking.
147. SeeAndrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (holding that a denial of the most prof-
itable use of property is not a taking because "a reduction in the value of property is not
necessarily equated with a taking"); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978) (holding that a government may enact a law t1at affects economic values without
effecting a taking).
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%upport estate.' "148 The petitioner, Keystone, contended that by
requiring it to leave twenty-seven million tons of coal in the
ground, the Act destroyed the value of Keystone's support estate
and therefore constituted a taking.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Keystone majority, declared,
"[O]ur test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value
that has been taken from the property with the value that remains
in the property." 49 The court established a fraction with the value
of the entire remaining property as the denominator and the value
of the property affected by the regulation as the numerator. Analy-
sis of this ratio required a definition of the unit of property, the
value of which was to become the denominator of the fraction.' 50
In Keystone, the denominator was "any reasonable unit of petition-
ers' coal mining operations and financial-backed expectations." 5 '
The numerator was that part of the twenty-seven million tons of
coal left in the ground solely because of the Act.152 Even the entire
Stwenty-seven million tons represented less than two percent of peti-
tioner's coal in place.15 3 Thus, "[t]he 27 million tons of coal do
not constitute a separate segment of property for takings law
purposes."'I
In his dissent, Rehnquist contended that the support estate was
a separate estate under Pennsylvania law and was purchased as
such. He argued that no further analysis is needed when "regula-
tion extinguishes the whole bundle of rights in an identifiable seg-
ment of property." 55 Stevens countered, "The record is devoid of
148. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 478.
149. Id. at 497.
150. See Michelman, supra note 80, at 1192.
151. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 499.
152. Id.
155. Id. at 496.
154. Id. at 498. This ratio technique was also used in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v.- New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In that case, the plaintiff, owner of Grand
Central Terminal, was prohibited by the Ndw York City Landmarks Preservation Law from
erecting an office building above the Terminal. The plaintiff argued that by not allowing it
to build upward, the law constituted a taking of the "air rights" above the Terminal. The
Supreme Court held that no taking had occurred, reasoning that in takings analysis, courts
must focus on the interference of rights in the entire parcel, which in this case was the city
tax block designated as a "landmark site." Id. at 131. Thus, the denominator was the city
tax block and the numerator was the air rights. like the rights to the underground coal in
Keystone the air rights alone did not constitute a distinct property. Similarly, in Andris,
Justice Brennan noted that "the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle [of property
rights] is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." 444 U.S. 51, 66
(1979).
155. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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any evidence on what percentage of the purchased support estates
... has been affected by the Act." 15 6 Stevens adopted the conclu-
sion of the Pennsylvania Court of Appeals that "as a practical mat-
ter the support estate is always owned by either the owner of the
surface or the owner of the minerals. "
15 7
It is no coincidence that, seven years later in Dolan, Rehnquist
writes for the majority and Stevens for the dissent. Mrs. Dolan's
inability to control access to the greenway becomes tantamount to
her loss of the right to exclude, which is one of the basic sticks in
the bundle of property rights.158 The Dolan majority ignored the
commercial context and concluded-and herein lies the fallacy-
that the regulated inability to control access over one-tenth of the
property (most of which was in the floodplain anyway) constituted
a separate segment of property for takings purposes. Thus,.Rehn-
quist's narrow definition of the relevant property interest for tak-
ings analysis has prevailed, Stevens' opinion notwithstanding, nor
Brennan's before him, nor Brandeis' before him.
B. State Court Decisions Relied on by the Dolan Majority Fail to
Provide Doctrinal Support
Dolan cites Nollan'I and state supreme court decisions 160 to ad-
vance the proposition that there must be an essential nexus be-
tween the condition imposed on a development and the police
power justification for that condition. Then, by some mysterious
process ofjudicial alchemy, the Court announces the dual require-
ment that the exaction must be related both in nature and in extent
to the needs created by the requested construction and that both
of these requirements must be proven by the governmental entity
imposing the condition. This section argues that the state court
cases cited in Dolan do not support the new "extent" requirement,
156. Id. at 501.
157. Id. at 500-01; see also Hugh G. Montgomery, The Development of the Right of Subja-
cent Support and the "Third Estate in Pennsylvania,"25 TEMP. LQ. 1, 21-22 (1951) (the sup-
port estate cannot be conveyed separately to a third party having no interest in the surface
or mineral estate, but may be conveyed in conjunction with either the surface or mineral
estate).
158. See Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV.
187, 191, 206 (1992) (stating that the right to exclude protects the autonomy of the prop-
erty owner and allows that person to have the exclusive right to possession within his or her
privately owned property).
159. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
160. See supra note 67.
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and that at least two cases, Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls 61 and
Call v. City of West Jordan,62 came to exactly the opposite conclu-
sion: that municipalities need not prove that the condition is
"roughly proportional" to the new demands imposed by the
development.
1. Jordan v. Menomonee Falls.
In Jordan, the village passed a land use ordinance prior to the
property owners' acquisition of a 7.85-acre parcel purchased with
the intention of subdividing the land into lots. Essentially, the ordi-
nance required the dedication of enough acreage to satisfy open
space requirements created by the new subdivision's need for
school, park, and recreation land.1 63 The amount of land to be
dedicated was determined by the village based on national plan-
ning experience and average land values in the village. The dedi-
cation requirement was $200 worth of land per new lot, with the
value to be established by appraisal. In lieu of the required land
dedication, the ordinance gave the subdivider the option to pay a
fee equal to $200 per lot-." The property owners paid the equali-
zation fee under protest. Later, they sued for its return and won in
the trial court. The village appealed.
In reversing and holding for the village, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court first concluded that the pertinent state statute'6
161. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965).
162. 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979).
163. Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 444 (citing MENOMONFE FALLS, WIf, Osmw'ANcEs
§ 8.02(1) (1959) ("8.02 Dedication of Sites. (1) Within the corporate limits of the Village,
Where feasible and compatible with the comprehensive plan for development of the con-
munity, the subdivider shall provide and dedicate to the public adequate land to provide
for the school, park and recreation needs of the subdivision.")).
164. Id. (citing MENoiONEE FAuS, WIs, Onx 'ANCES §§ 8.02(2), 8.03(1), 8.03(2)):
8.02(2) The amount of land to be provided shall be determined on the basis
of an amount equal in value to $200.00 per residential lot.... Such value shall
be determined by the Village assessor on the basis of full and fair market value of
the land....
8.03" Proportionate Payment in Lieu of Dedication.
(1) Where such dedication is not feasible or compatible With the compre-
hensive plan, the subdivider shall in lieu thereof pay to the Village a fee
equivalent to the value of the required dedication....
A. $120.00 per residential lot.., for the benefit of the school district
B. $80.00 per residential lot.., to be used for park and recreation area
development....
(2) Such fees shall be used exclusively for immediate or future site acquisi-
tion or capital improvement.
165. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 236.45 (Vest 1957):
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sanctioned the land dedication and equalization fee aspects of the
village's ordinance. 66 The court then addressed the property own-
ers' argument that the ordinance amounted to an unconstitutional
taking. The court began by examining an Illinois standard: "' [I~f
the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely
attributable to his activity, then the requirement is permissi-
ble.' "167 The Wisconsin court affirmed this formulation, provided
that its application was not so narrow as to put an unreasonable
burden of proof on local government:
In most instances it would be impossible for the municipality to
prove that the land required to be dedicated for a park or a
school site was to meet a need solely attributable to the antici-
pated influx of people into the community to occupy this particu-
lar subdivision. On the other hand, the municipality might well
be able to establish that a group of subdivisions approved over a
period of several years had been responsible for bringing into the
community a considerable number of people making it necessary
that the land dedications required of the subdividers be utilized
for school, park, and recreational purposes for the benefit of
such influx. In the absence of contravening evidence this would
establish a reasonable basis for finding that the need for the ac-
quisition was occasioned by the activity of the subdivider....
We conclude, that a required dedication of land for school,
park, or recreational sites as a condition for approval of the sub-
division plat should be upheld as a valid exercise of police power
if the evidence reasonably establishes that the municipality will be
required to provide more land for schools, parks, and play-
grounds as a result of approval of the subdivision.' 68
Dolan, on the other hand, requires the government to make an
"individualized determination" that the impact of the new con-
struction and the exaction are closely related both in nature and in
extent. 69 Jordan is one of the primary cases on which the Dolan
majority relies. Yet Jordan's sensitivity to the village's evidentiary
burden, the minimal and generalized nature of that burden, the
Local subdivision regulation.
(1) Declaration of legislative intent. The purpose of this section is to pro-
mote the public health, safety and general welfare ....
(2) Delegation of power. (a) To accomplish the purposes listed in sub. (1),
any municipality... which has established a planning agency may adopt ordi-
nances governing the subdivision or other division of land which are more restric-
tive than the provisions of this chapter.
166. Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 446-47.
167. Id. at 447 (quoting Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 176
N.E.2d 799, 802 (Il1. 1961)).
168. Id. at 447-48.
169. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
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emphasis on benefits received by the subdivider, and the applica-
tion of the constitutional standard to the facts in the Wisconsin
decision do not support Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Had
Jordan been reviewed by the Dolan Court, the village's ordinance
would have failed the Dolan test and the Court would have found a
compensable taking.
2. Call v. City of West Jordan.
The Dolan majority also relied on Call v. City of West Jordan. In
Call, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the validity of a city ordi-
nance stipulating that subdividers must dedicate seven percent of
their land in the proposed subdivision or make a cash payment
equal to that value, with such land or money to be used for the
purposes of "flood control and/or parks and recreational facili-
ties."170 The landowners argued that the dedicated land, or its cash
equivalent, would benefit the entire community, not just the resi-
dents of the new subdivision, and therefore was a taking."'
Using language that contravenes the basic requirements of
"rough proportionality," the Utah Supreme Court said:
We agree that the dedication should have some reasonable
relationship to the needs created by the subdivision. But in the
planning for the expansion of a city, it is obvious that no particu-
lar percentage of each subdivision, or of each lot, could be used
as a park or playground in that particular subdivision; and like-
wise, that it could not be so used for flood control. But it is so
plain as to hardly require expression that if the purpose of the
ordinance is properly carried out, it will redound to the benefit
of the subdivision as well as to .the general welfare of the whole
community. The fact that it does so, rather than solely benefiting
the individual subdivision, does not impair the validity of the
ordinance.' 72
The Utah Supreme Court also held that communities have signifi-
cant discretion in determining the extent of the requirement:
The question as to the percentage of the land in the subdivi-
sion (in this instance, 7 percent) to be committed to the public
purpose is within the prerogative of the City Council to deter-
mine, and so long as it is within reasonable limits, so that it can-
not be characterized as capricious or arbitrary, the courts will not •
interfere therewith.' 73
170. Call v. City of WestJordan, 606 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah 1979) (citingWEsrJoRDAN,
UTAH, Am. ORDiN.cE No. 33 § 9-C-8(b) (1975).
171. Id. at 220.
172. Id. (footnotes omitted).
173. Id. at 221 (footnote omitted); see also Associated Home Builders of the Greater
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This is a far cry from the Dolan requirement that "the city must
make, some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development."174 Therefore, to say that Call supports the
new doctrine of "rough proportionality" transports the reader to
Alice in Wonderland, where "[w] hen I use a Word... it meansjust
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." 175 Clearly, Call
would have been reversed had it been decided by the Dolan Court.
C. Past Cases Do Not Support the Dolan Decision
Each of the three Supreme Court decisions discussed above
contained a major constitutional proposition that was later altered
by Dolan. Goldblatt exemplified the traditional burden of proof,
crucial parts of which have been shifted by Dolan; Hadacheck, unlike
Dolan, gave traditional deference to the city's exercise of police
power;. and Keystone clarified the formula for identifying a distinct
segment of property for takings purposes, which was ignored in
Dolan. The Dolan majority relied on two state supreme court cases,
Jordan and Call, as the foundation for new takings jurisprudence;
however, neither decision supports the new Dolan doctrine. 176 In
all five of these cases, the Dolan majority would have changed the
outcome. Clearly, it is the Dolan decision that cries out for
reconsideration.
VII. CONCLUSION
With precious little compelling precedent, the Court imposes
the new quantitative requirement of rough proportionality on all
East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971) (upholding constitutional-
ity of a city ordinance requiring a subdivider, as a condition on the approval of a subdivi-
sion map, to dedicate land or pay fees for the creation of a park or recreational area).
174. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (emphasis added).
175. Imws CARRoLU, AucE THROUGH THE LOoUNc GLASS 94 (Random House 1946)
(1872).
76. The Dolan decision was equally unsupported by three other state supreme court
decisions cited bythe majority: Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976)
(upholding a city law requiring dedication of land or donation of money for parks because
there was a reasonable relationship between the conditioned approval of the subdivision
and the municipality's need for land); Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297
(Neb. 1980) (invalidating a city ordinance requiring as a condition for building permit
approval a grant of a "right-of-way" to the city to satisfy some future public purpose where
no reasonable relationship or nexus existed); City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.,
680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984) (upholding constitutionality of a city ordinance requiring
either dedication of parkland or money in lieu thereof when undertaking subdivision de-
velopment since it was "substantially related" to the health, safety, and general welfare of
the public).
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levels of government in cases involving building permit applica-
tions. Examination of every state supreme court case cited and re-
lied on by the Dolan iajority reveals that none of these cases places
on government the evidentiary burden of proof to "make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development."'"7 Appallingly, these cases do not remotely support
the constitutional foundation of the Court's new rough propor-
tionality doctrine.
Oblivious to precedent,17 8 the Dolan majority implies, by its si-
lence, that neither the benefits to the property owner nor the true
economic impact on the property owner from permit conditions
are legally relevant in takings analyses. In addition, the Court nar-
rows to an unrecognizable forxii the concept of a "distinct segment
of property for takings law purposes."179 Mrs. Dolan's inability to
control certain hours of ingress and egress along the greenway trig-
gers the imposition of the Court's new doctrine regardless of the
fact that she wants as many people as possible to have access to all
of her property during business hours. Ironically, all of the state
cases cited by Chief Justice Rehnquist use the landowner's entire
parcel as the denominator in their examination of the impact of
the exaction. If the trend from Penn Central to Keystone to Dolan
continues, the definition of a distinct segment of property for tak-
ings law purposes will dwindle to a mere nothingness.
The new doctrine is ajudicial reach, which its application to the
facts of Dolan clearly reveals. There is no question that Mrs. Do-
lan's new store would add more surface water runoff into Fanno
creek. Nor is there any question that the required ddication
would put the City in a position to mitigate the effects of the pro-
posed construction. Rehnquist's crucial statement-"the city has
never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was
required in the interest of flood control"'S0-is wrong. The City
made it clear that public management was necessary and was man-
dated.by the Comprehensive Plan, the Community Development
Code, and the City's Master Drainage Plan, in order to reduce
flooding along Fanno Creek.
Was the extent of the dedication roughly proportional in a
177. Doran v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319-20 (1994).
178. &e supra part M1.
179. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987) (in-
ternal citation omitted).
180. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
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quantitative sense to the anticipated impact of the new construc-
tion? Hopefully not! Ideally, the dedication would help the City to
reduce far more floodwater than Mrs. Dolan's new construction
would add to the creek.' 1 Preventing this public benefit through
the application of the "degree" component of "rough proportion-
ality" illustrates the complete illogicality of the new quantitative
requirement.
Regarding the bike path dedication, the City used its traffic
study but failed to predict how many of the projected 435 extra
automobile trips per day would be reduced by the bike path. It is
self-evident that there would be a reduction in the amount of auto-
mobile traffic. The Comprehensive Plan says so. Land use plan-
ning experts say so. The constitutional validity of the state's
exercise of its police power in takings cases has been reduced to a
guessing game.
This Article has demonstrated that significant past state and
federal regulatory takings cases would now be decided differently
under Dolan's formulation. Judicial "progress" is one thing, but af-
ter the decision in Dolan, it is hard to see where the Court, in fu-
ture land use permit cases, will find that no compensable taking
has occurred.
And that brings us to the shift in the burden of proof. Among
all the negatives in the Dolan decision, this shift will have the most
negative effect. Disregarding decades of deference to the states'
exercise of their police power, the Court unleashes delay, denial,
- litigation, and incalculable economic waste, all of which add to'the
consumer's financial burden. And the Court does all of this in one
footnote that is false in its asserted justification "I82
The property rights movement initially celebrated its victory in
the Dolan decision, but these folks, along with the rest of America,
may well end up regretting it. When federal agencies become par-
alyzed in the effectuation of national environmental policies; when
local governments, many of whose debentures are already classified
as "junk bonds," deny or delay responses to building permits be-
cause they do not have the financial resources to satisfy Dolan's evi-
dentiary requirements; when people everywhere realize that
federal, state, and local governments will go bankrupt if the Dolan
majority continues its present trend in takings jurisprudence (espe-
181. Perhaps Mrs. Dolan's development would add only a thimbleful of water. Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 447 (Or. 1993) (Peterson, J., dissenting).
182. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 14:215
HeinOnline  -- 14 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 254 1995
TAKINGS LAW
cially in view of the threat of current congressional legislation call-
ing for compensation to be paid whenever federal regulation
diminishes private property values) ;13 when taxes skyrocket to pay
for all these "takings"; when new housing prices escalate because of
the cost of the delays engendered by Dolan; when all of this hap-
pens, Oliver Wendell Holmes' aphorism814 will be remembered
with nostalgia, and property rights advocates, along with the rest of
us, will yearn for the good old days.
One of the saddest aspects of the Dolan decision is that takings
jurisprudence did not need another doctrine. Penn Centra4 Agins,
Loretto, Keystone, Nollan, and Lucas were all in place and could have
continued as decisional touchstones for a long time to come. The
Court should return to a case-by-case analysis using Brennan's bal-
ancing criteria from Penn Central, the Nollan nexus test, and assess-
ment of the real economic impact on the property owner. Above
all, the Court should rescind the new evidentiary burden of proof
in takings cases. Given the proper nexus, building permit condi-
tions should be invalidated only in cases in which the property-
owner establishes that the exaction is arbitrary, discriminatory, or
severely unreasonable.
Is there anything good to be said of the Dolan decision? An
editorial in the Tampa Tribune indicates, if nothing else, that the
decision was politically popular. 1 5 This is hardly surprising: the
inescapable conclusion drawn from everything examined in this
Article is that the Dolan decision was predetermined, ideologically
and politically driven by the same constituency that cheered its out-
come. Responding to the current political climate and disdaining
deference to a hundred years of cases involving procedurally
proper legislative and administrative actions, the Court in Dolan
has embarked on the dangerous path of political, not constitu-
tional, decisionmaking.
183. In response to such legislation, a Philadelphia real estate developerwrote: 'We-
lands laws protect property values by keeping communities attractive and by buffering
floods. ...- Under the new anti-regulation agenda, homeowners' property values are
threatened. Also the sheer cost of paying property owners for their claims and the specter
of continual litigation would dramatically undermine our environmental laws. So called
property rights bills would not protect property but simply transfer control of property
values from homeowners to large owners of undeveloped land." Dan Gordon, In 77Press
Devdoper Attacks Takings, N.Y. TMIMES, Mar. 15, 1995.
184. "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change ... ." Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
185. See Court Upholds Property Rights, TAzpA TuB., July 8, 1994, at 10.
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